Body and World is a republished edition of Todes's doctoral dissertation, The Human Body as Material Subject of the World. The bulk of the book consists of Material Subject, but also contained are introductions by Hubert Dreyfus and Piotr Hoffman, as well as three appendices by Todes (an unpublished note dated January 1993, a republished essay on Sensuous Abstraction, and a postscript outlining what would have followed in Todes's uncompleted sequel, The Human Body as Personal Subject of Society).
In the hope that doing so will stimulate interest and clarify Todes's project, I am posting here the Table of Contents to The Human Body as Material Subject of the World.
Author's Introduction
1 The Classic View of the Way the Human Subject Has His [/Her] Body, and Descartes's Rejection of It
1.1 The Classic View
1.2 Descartes's Rejection of the Classic View
1.2.1 The discovery of human necessity, and its first consequences for the philosophy of the
body
1.2.2 The ambiguity of Descartes's version of the human subject
1.2.3 Summary of Descartes's view
2 Critique of the Resulting World-Subject of Leibniz and Hume, with an Introductory Exposition of the Thesis That the Human Body Is the Material Subject of the World
2.1 The Mitosis of Cartesian Philosophy
2.2 A New Consensus: The Human Subject as Explicating the Unity of the World
2.3 The Change in the Sense of the "Representational" Character of Experience
2.4 The Human Body Veiled
2.4.1 Leibniz's veiling of the human body
2.4.2 Hume's veiling of the human body
2.5 Phenomenological Interlude
2.5.1 Body feelings as objects
2.5.2 The three functions of the body of the active subject
2.5.3 The body as an object
2.5.4 Space and time as correlates of the active subject's body
2.5.5 A note on method
2.5.6 Types of spatiotemporal emptiness
2.5.7 Satisfaction
2.5.8 Pain
2.5.9 Disappearance
2.5.10 Antifacts
2.5.11 Responsiveness
2.6 Re-consideration of Hume
2.6.1 The nonvariability of the human body unnoticed by Hume
2.6.2 Observation, perceptual interference, and poise: Hume's view criticized
2.6.3 Critique of Hume on pleasure and pain
2.6.4 Critique of Hume on the uniformity of nature
2.6.5 Critique of Hume on the foundation of probability
2.6.6 Clarification of Hume's view of belief
2.6.7 The problem of the continued existence of unobserved objects
2.6.8 Hume's admission of an inadequate account of the active life
2.7 Conclusion
2.8 Transition to Chapter 3
3 Introductory Discussion of Kant's View That the Human Subject Makes the World of His [/Her] Experience
3.1 The Development of Kant's Thought
3.2 Summary of My Kant Criticism: That Kant Imaginizes Perception
3.3 Phenomenological Studies To Be Used in Support of My Kant Criticism
4 Development of the Phenomenology of Practical Perception, as a Prelude to the Criticism That Kant Imaginizes Perception
4.0 General Statement of Problems Considered in This Chapter, and of the Conclusion To Be Demonstrated
4.1 Defense against Aristotle's Thesis That a Self-Moved Mover Is Impossible
4.2 The Perceptual Sense of the Passage of Time: A Correlate of the Self-Activity of the Percipient
4.3 The Perceptual World as a Field of Fields-within-Fields: The General Significance of This Fact, and the Significance of the Particular Order of Field-Inclusion
4.4 Why the Percipient Is Satisfied with the Perception of an Object; How It Fulfills His [/Her] Active Body
4.4.1 The bodily basis of the irreversibility of perceptual time
4.4.2 How passing an object enables the percipient to determine it as a concrete unity
4.4.3 The vertical field
4.4.4 Perceptual fulfillment as practical self-composure
5 The Phenomenology of Imagination, as a Final Prelude to the Criticism that Kant Imaginizes Perception
5.0 Introduction: Restriction of the Topic
5.0.1 Restriction of the topic in respect to the mediation of perception and imagination by
inactive spectation
5.0.2 Restriction of the topic in respect to the fusion of perception and imagination in
imaginative perception
5.0.3 Restriction of the topic to the single modality of conceptual imagination
5.1 The Imaginative Transformation of Our Relation to the World
5.1.1 Our imaginative capacity is its own initial field of productivity
5.1.2 The imaginative transformation of balance and poise
5.2 The New Kind of Series Possible in the World of Imagination
5.3 The World of Imagination as a Field of Explicatable Images instead of Determinable Objects
5.4 The Imaginative Transformation of the Extent to Which the World Can Be Filled
5.5 The Imaginative Transformation of Our Role in Contributing Significance to Our Experience
5.6 Summary of the Main Contrasts between Imagination and Perception
6 Development of the Thesis That the Human Body Is the Material Subject of the World, as a Critique of Kant's View That the Human Subject Makes the World of His [/Her] Experience
6.0 The Critique of Pure Reason in the Light of a Phenomenology of Impure Experience
6.1 Kant's False Dilemma of A Priori Knowledge: How It Arises from Imaginizing the World
6.2 The Ego, According to Kant: Its Three Stages of Self-Evidence
6.3 Phenomenological Criticism: Kant Imaginizes the Ego
6.4 Kant's View of Spatial Objects: Spatialization as Conceptualization
6.5 The Missing Perceptual Stage: How Is a Local Object Determinable?
6.6 The "Common, but to us Unknown, Root"
6.7 Kantian Categories as Imaginative Idealizations of Perceptual Categories
6.7.1 Deduction of perceptual categories from the felt unity of the active body, as Kant deduces
imaginative categories from the transcendental unity of apperception
6.7.2 The concept of nothing (= 0) versus the perceptual sense of nothing (= -x)
6.8 Kant's Dialectic: Perception Takes Revenge
6.8.1 The antinomies of the Paralogisms: the suppressed perceptual thesis vs. the imaginative
antithesis
6.8.2 The perceptual thesis vs. the imaginative antithesis of Kant's Antinomies; or, the fruitless
question: Which form of objectivity is the right one?
6.8.3 The antinomies of the Ideal of pure reason: the suppressed perceptual thesis versus the
imaginative antithesis
6.9 Summary, and Concluding Remarks
General Conclusion
